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In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term
contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct
evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that contracts
provide reference points. In this paper, we examine experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated
in their theory. The evidence confirms the model's prediction that there is a tradeoff between rigidity
and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the
state of nature. Flexible contracts - which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions
- cause a significant amount of shading on ex post performance, while under rigid contracts, much
less shading occurs. Thus, although rigid contracts rule out trading in some states of the world, parties
frequently implement them. While our results are broadly consistent with established behavioral concepts,
they cannot easily be explained by existing theories. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral
force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur
mainly about outcomes within the contract.
Ernst Fehr
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I.  Introduction 
In a recent paper Hart and Moore (2008) develop a theory which provides a basis for long-
term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments. The theory is also capable of 
rationalizing the employment contract, which fixes wages in advance and leaves discretion to 
the employer. The theory rests, however, on strong behavioral assumptions that lack direct 
empirical  support  and  deviate  in  important  ways  from  the  assumptions  made  in  standard 
contract theory. For this reason, and because of the potentially far-reaching implications of 
the new theory, it seems particularly important to provide empirical support for the theory. In 
this paper, we provide an experimental test of some of the key predictions of the theory of 
Hart and Moore (2008). In doing so, we identify new behavioral forces that can neither be 
explained by traditional contract theory nor by currently existing behavioral models. These 
forces  are,  however,  predicted  by  the  Hart-Moore  notion  that  competitively  determined 
contracts perform the function of reference points. 
It is useful to start with some background and motivation. According to the standard 
incomplete contracts literature, trading parties find it difficult to write a long-term contract 
because the future is hard to foresee. As time passes and uncertainty is resolved, the parties 
can  complete their contract through renegotiation. The typical model supposes symmetric 
information and no wealth constraints, so that Coasian bargaining ensures ex post efficiency. 
However, there is a hold-up problem: as a consequence of renegotiation, each party shares 
some of the fruits of prior (non-contractible) investments with the other party. Anticipating 
this, each party under-invests. 
While this approach has been useful for studying asset ownership (see Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), it has been less useful for studying the employment 
relationship and the internal organization of large firms. In order to broaden the approach, 
Hart and Moore (2008) develop a theory based on the idea that an ex ante contract, negotiated 
under  competitive  conditions,  shapes  parties’  entitlements  regarding  ex  post  outcomes.  A 
party compares the ex post outcome to other outcomes permitted by the contract, and if he 
does not get what he feels entitled to he is aggrieved and shades on non-contractible aspects 
of performance. This yields a tradeoff between contractual rigidity and flexibility. A flexible 
contract is good in that parties can adjust to the state of nature, but bad in that there is a lot of 
shading. In contrast, a rigid contract is good in that there is little shading, but bad in that 
parties cannot adjust to the state of nature. – 2 – 
Although some of the assumptions underlying the model are broadly consistent with 
well-established  behavioral  concepts  such  as  reference-dependent  preferences  (e.g., 
Kahnemann  and  Tversky  (1979),  Köszegi  and  Rabin  (2006)),  self-serving  biases  (e.g., 
Babcock  and  Loewenstein  (1997)),  and  social  preferences  (e.g.,  Rabin  (1993),  Fehr  and 
Schmidt (1999)), there is not yet any empirical evidence that directly supports the idea that 
contracts are reference points for trading relationships. It is the aim of this study to close this 
gap with evidence from a controlled laboratory experiment. 
Our experiment is based on the payoff uncertainty model in Hart and Moore (2008). In 
this model, a buyer and a seller trade one unit of a standard good, but there is uncertainty ex 
ante about the buyer’s value and the seller’s cost. This uncertainty is resolved ex post, and 
there is symmetric information throughout. However, value and cost are not verifiable, and so 
state-contingent  contracts  cannot  be  written.  The  model  assumes  that  ex  post  trade  is 
voluntary. Given that value and cost are uncertain, there may be no single price such that both 
parties gain from trade at this price whenever value exceeds cost. Thus, to ensure trade, a 
range  of  possible  prices  may  be  required  in  the  ex  ante  contract.  However,  under  the 
assumptions of the model, this leads to ex post aggrievement and shading. 
In Hart and Moore (2008), the first best can be achieved if either value or cost is 
certain, given that lump sum transfers are possible. In the experiment, we rule out lump-sum 
transfers. A consequence is that the first-best result does not apply, and we can simplify 
matters by assuming that only the seller’s cost is uncertain. We also make the simplifying 
assumption that only the seller can shade.  
In the experiment buyers and sellers meet and contract at date 0. Trade of zero or one 
unit of a good occurs at date 1. There are two states of nature: a good state, in which a seller’s 
cost is low, and a bad state, in which cost is high. At date 0, the state of nature is uncertain. 
Contracting involves two steps. In the first step, a buyer determines what type of contract he 
wants: a flexible contract or a rigid contract. In a rigid contract, the price is fixed; a flexible 
contract defines a price range out of which the buyer will pick the price after the state of 
nature has been  realized.  In the second step, the contract is  auctioned  off to sellers. The 
auction not only determines which of the sellers gets the contract but also defines the contract 
terms (i.e., the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price range in flexible 
contracts). The buyer and seller then move to date 1. They are now in a situation of bilateral 
monopoly, and the state of nature is determined. Trade takes place only if the date 0 contract 
allows for a mutually beneficial outcome in the realized state. Competition ensures that the – 3 – 
price in the rigid contract is sufficiently low that trade is possible only in the good state, while 
trade is always possible in the flexible contract. In the flexible contract, the buyer picks a 
price above the seller’s cost from the price range. In the rigid contract, only the fixed price is 
available. After trade occurs (if it is possible), the seller decides whether to shade. Shading 
takes the form of costly sabotage: the seller spends resources to lower her quality from normal 
to low. Shading has a small cost for the seller but greatly reduces the buyer’s value. 
Under the assumptions of the standard economic model (rationality, selfishness and 
sub-game perfection), the prediction for this experiment is straightforward. Since shading is 
costly, sellers should always provide normal quality, irrespective of the contract type and the 
price. Buyers should anticipate the sellers’ behavior and therefore always choose the lowest 
price permitted by their contract. The competitive auction used to assign contracts to sellers 
should ensure that the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price range in 
flexible contracts is at the competitive level. Accordingly, both contract types yield the same 
outcome in the good state of nature, while only the flexible contract allows for trade in the 
bad state. This implies that buyers should always choose the more profitable flexible contract. 
However,  if  the  behavioral  assumptions  of  Hart  and  Moore  (2008)  apply,  the 
prediction is different. The assumption that contracts are reference points does not affect the 
prediction concerning the competitive  auction outcomes. But if  contracts define reference 
points, the contract type may affect the sellers’ quality choice. Since rigid contracts pin down 
outcomes, sellers get what they expect and should not be aggrieved. Accordingly, shading 
should not occur in rigid contracts. In flexible contracts, in contrast, sellers may be aggrieved 
if they get a lower price than they had hoped for. This may trigger shading. In response, 
buyers  may  either  increase  the  price  in  flexible  contracts  to  avoid  shading  or  accept  the 
possibility of getting low quality. Either way, the reference dependent behavior of sellers has 
a negative impact on the buyers’ profit in flexible contracts. Thus, if the willingness to engage 
in shading is strong enough, buyers may find switching to rigid contracts profitable. 
What are the results of the experiment? They are largely in line with Hart and Moore 
(2008). The auction process indeed induces strong competition for contracts. Both the fixed 
price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price range in flexible contracts converge 
to the competitive level over time. However, despite the fact that, in principle, buyers have 
the  possibility  to  pay  the  same  prices  in  both  types  of  contracts  when  the  good  state  is 
realized,  we  observe  that  buyers  pay  significantly  higher  prices  in  flexible  contracts. 
Moreover,  depending  on  the  price  paid,  there  is  considerable  seller  shading  in  flexible – 4 – 
contracts in the good state. In contrast, there is almost no shading in rigid contracts. Under the 
parameter values of the experiment, the rigid contract is more profitable than the flexible 
contract even though it precludes trade in the bad state. Furthermore, a substantial fraction of 
buyers choose the rigid contract. 
It is worth noting that these results not only provide empirical support for the model of 
Hart  and  Moore  but  they  also  constitute  new  insights  into  the  behavioral  economics  of 
fairness. To see this in more detail it is important to note that rigid contracts typically lead to 
very low earnings for the seller and a very uneven distribution of the gains from trade. Thus, 
by proposing a rigid contract, a buyer makes an unfair proposal so that one would expect the 
sellers to shade a lot under rigid contracts. In fact, theories of inequity aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) suggest that there should be considerable shading 
in the rigid contract since the surplus is very unevenly distributed. Likewise intention-based 
fairness theories (Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, 
Falk and Fischbacher 2006) also suggest that there should be shading in the rigid contract 
since the choice of the rigid contract signals rather ungenerous intentions (the rigid contract 
lowers the seller’s payoff in the good state and prevents trade in the bad state, and so it would 
be generous of the buyer to choose the flexible contract). However, despite the very uneven 
distribution of the gains from trade the sellers rarely shade in rigid contracts.  
Our  evidence  becomes  even  more  puzzling  –  when  viewed  through  the  lens  of 
traditional theories of fairness – if we compare the low frequency of shading in rigid contracts 
with what happens under flexible contracts. In the latter we observe a lot of shading even 
though the sellers receive a higher share of the gains from trade than under rigid contracts. 
This pattern of shading across contract types makes perfect sense, however, if competitively 
determined contracts provide reference points which demand special normative status. We 
thus  believe  that  our  experiment  reveals  a  new  behavioral  force:  ex  ante  competition 
legitimizes the terms of the contract, and aggrievement occurs mainly about outcomes within 
the contract and not about the contract itself. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  In  section  II,  we  describe  the  design  of  our 
experiment and provide details on procedures. Section III contains the behavioral predictions. 
We present our results in section IV and discuss them in section V. Section VI concludes. 
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II.  Experimental Design 
In this section we present our experimental design. Section II.A roughly summarizes the main 
features of the implemented market. We then specify the details of the experimental game in 
Section II.B, followed by a description of the experimental procedures in Section II.C. 
II.A.  Overview 
We  implement  an  experimental  market  where  buyers  and  sellers  meet  to  trade.  Each 
transaction involves two dates. At date 0 the trading parties meet and conclude a contract. At 
date 1 they trade zero or one unit of a product. Traders do not yet know the state of nature at 
date 0. Accordingly, a flexible contract that allows adjustments to the realized state of nature 
may be desirable. The market setup implies that supply exceeds demand. Accordingly, sellers 
compete for contracts with buyers at date 0. The allocation of contracts takes place in two 
steps: First, each buyer determines whether he wants to conclude a flexible or a rigid contract. 
Then  a  competitive  auction  determines  which  seller  gets  the  contract.  All  contracts  are 
incomplete, because quality cannot be perfectly specified, i.e. a contract cannot prevent a 
seller from choosing low quality instead of normal quality. The uncertainty about the state of 
nature is resolved at date 1. However, while the state of nature is observable to the trading 
parties, it is not verifiable. This implies that state contingent contracts are infeasible. Trade 
occurs only if the contract terms are such that both parties can benefit from trading in the 
realized state of nature. Otherwise the parties walk away and realize an outside option. In case 
of trade the buyer refines the terms within the limits of the contract and the seller determines 
the quality. 
II.B.  Experimental Game and Parameters 
There are 28 market participants in each experimental session, 14 in the role of buyers and 14 
in the role of sellers. In each of the 15 periods of the experiment sellers and buyers interact in 
groups of two buyers and two sellers. To minimize the role of reputational considerations, 
these interaction groups are randomly reconstituted in every period. 
In each period buyers and sellers have the possibility to trade a product. While every 
buyer can buy at most one unit of the product per period, each seller can sell up to two units. 
Since  there  is  an  equal  number  of  buyers  and  sellers,  this  implies  that  the  supply  of  the 
product is twice as large as the demand. Thus, sellers face competition for buyers. When a 
buyer purchases a unit of the product from a seller his payoff is given by his valuation for the 
product v minus the price p. The payoff of the seller is calculated as the difference between – 6 – 
the price p and the production cost c. While the buyer’s valuation for the product depends 
only on the seller’s ex-post quality choice q, the seller’s production cost also depends on the 
realized state of nature s. There are two states of the world: a good state (s = g), in which the 
seller’s production costs are low and a bad state (s = b), in which the production costs are 
high. The good state occurs with probability w
g = 0.8. 
The payoffs of buyers and sellers can be summarized as follows: 
Buyer’s payoff:  pB = v(q) – p. 
Seller’s payoff:  pS = p – c(q, s). 
When trade takes place sellers can choose between two quality levels: normal quality (q = q
n) 
or low quality (q = q
l). The production costs for low quality are slightly higher than the 
production costs for normal quality: c(q
l, s) > c(q
n, s). The idea is that it is most convenient 
for sellers if they simply do their job. They can, however, sabotage output (at the expense of a 
small cost) if they want to.
4 For each unit of the product which a seller cannot sell – either 
because he lost the contract to the other seller in his trading group at date 0 or because his 
contract does not allow for a mutually beneficial trade at date 1 – he realizes an outside option 
of xS = 10. When a buyer is unable to trade a unit of the product at date 1, he also realizes an 
outside option of xB = 10. 
Table I summarizes the cost and value parameters of the experiment: 
Insert Table I here 
Each period of the experiment is structured as follows: 
Date 0: Contracting 
Step 1: Random formation of interaction groups 
At the beginning of every period the interaction groups consisting of two buyers and two 
sellers are randomly determined. The rematching of participants at the beginning of every 
period makes sure that reputation effects cannot play a substantial role in our experiment. 
Step 2: The buyer’s contract choice 
Before  buyers’  contracts  are  auctioned  off  to  sellers,  each  buyer  has  to  decide  which 
contract type t he wants to offer in this period. It is important to note that the buyer can 
choose only the type of the contract, while the actual terms of the contract are defined by 
                                                 
4 An alternative interpretation is that there is a black-boxed incentive technology for good quality (e.g., the seller 
is punished in case of shading). – 7 – 
the sellers in a competitive auction process later on. Specifically, the buyer can choose 
between two types of contracts: rigid contracts (t = r) and flexible contracts (t = f). A rigid 
contract  fixes  the  price  at  date  0.  The  level  of  the  fixed  price  p
r  is  endogenously 
determined in the subsequent contract auction. The auction is set up in such a way that the 
fixed price lies always in the following interval: p
r Î [c(q
l,g) + xs, m] = [35, 75], where m 
is the exogenously set maximum for the fixed price.
5 A flexible contract, in contrast, 
specifies a price range [p
l, p
h] at date 0 out of which the buyer can choose the actual price 
at date 1. The upper bound of the price range is exogenously fixed and identical to the 
buyer’s valuation of the product when the seller provides normal quality: p
h = v(q
h) = 140. 
The lower bound of the price range is endogenously determined in the subsequent contract 
auction. The interval of potential lower price bounds is identical to the one for fixed prices 
in rigid contracts: p
l Î [35, 75]. 
Step 3: The sellers’ contract auction 
When  both  buyers  in  an  interaction  group  have  chosen  their  contract  type,  the  two 
contracts  are  auctioned  off  to  the  sellers.  The  sequence  of  the  auctions  is  randomly 
determined within each group. In case of a rigid contract, the auction directly determines 
the fixed price p
r. In case of a flexible contract, the auction determines the lower bound of 
the price range p
l. In both cases the auction starts off at 35 and then increases by one unit 
every half second. Each of the two sellers has a button that allows him to accept the 
contract at any time during the auction. Thus, the first seller who is willing to accept the 
displayed fixed price or the displayed lower price bound respectively gets the contract. 
The seller who loses the auction and does not get the contract realizes the outside option 
xS. 
Date 1: Trade 
Step 4: Determination of the state of nature 
After the contracts have been auctioned off to the sellers, a computerized random device 
determines the state of nature for each contract independently. Both sellers and buyers 
observe  the  realized  state  for  their  contracts  and  are  informed  whether  a  mutually 
beneficial transaction can take place or not. Trade can always take place when the buyer 
                                                 
5 The minimum of 35 for the fixed price ensures that the seller cannot make losses relative to his outside option 
in the good state even if he provides low quality. This feature ensures that sellers do not refrain from choosing 
low quality, just because they want to avoid losses (loss aversion). The maximum of 75 for the fixed price makes 
sure that the price is always below the seller’s cost in the bad state of nature. This guarantees that trade cannot 
occur if the bad state is realized. However, as we will see later on, in the experiment the upper bound was never 
binding. – 8 – 
has chosen a flexible contract, because the price range allows the buyer to choose prices 
that cover the seller’s cost in both states of nature. In the case of a rigid contract, in 
contrast, trade occurs only in the good state. In the bad state the fixed price is always 
lower than the seller’s cost, such that mutually beneficial transactions are not feasible. If 
trade does not occur, the buyer and the seller realize their outside options (xB and xS). 
Step 5: The buyer’s price choice 
Once the state has been revealed, the buyer can choose the actual trading price. In a rigid 
contract the buyer does not have a choice, since the price has already been fixed at date 0 
and cannot be changed. In a flexible contract, however, the buyer can determine his price. 
If the good state has been realized the buyer can choose any price p Î [p
l, p
h]. In the bad 
state the buyer has to make sure that the price is such that the seller cannot make losses, 
i.e., he must choose a price that satisfies p Î [c(q
l,b) + xS, v(q
h)] = [95, 140].
6 
Step 6: The seller’s quality choice 
Sellers observe the price choice of their buyer and then determine their quality. In both 
types of contracts the sellers have the choice between normal (q
n) and low (q
l) quality. 
Remember choosing low instead of normal quality increases the seller’s cost by 5 units 
irrespective of the contract type and realized state of nature (see Table I). 
Step 7: Profit calculations 
After the quality choice of sellers all decisions have been made. Profits are calculated and 
displayed on subjects’ screens. 
Step 8: Market information for the buyers 
Subsequent  to  viewing  the  profit  screen  buyers  also  get  some  aggregated  information 
about the market outcome. Specifically, they are informed about profits of buyers in both 
contract types averaged over all past periods. Furthermore, they learn how many buyers 
have chosen the rigid contract and the flexible contract in the current period.
7 
The screen with the market information for buyers ends the period. After this a new period 
begins and the participants are randomly reassigned to a new interaction group. 
                                                 
6 Again we do not allow prices to be such that the seller can make losses by choosing low quality, because we 
want to avoid the possibility that people refrain from shading due to loss aversion (see also Footnote 5). 
7 The aim of the provision of this information was to make learning easier for buyers. Since our setup allows for 
many possible constellations (two contract types, two states of nature, two quality levels, many prices), learning 
from individual experience is rather difficult. – 9 – 
II.C.  Subjects, Payments and Procedures 
All  subjects  were  students  of  the  University  of  Zurich  or  the  Swiss  Federal  Institute  of 
Technology  Zurich (ETH). Economists and psychologists were excluded from the subject 
pool. We used the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Each subject participated in 
only one session. Subjects were randomly subdivided into two groups before the start of the 
experiment; some were assigned the role of buyers and others the role of sellers. The subjects’ 
roles remained fixed for the whole session. All interactions were anonymous, i.e., the subjects 
did not know the personal identities of their trading partners. 
To  make  sure  that  subjects  fully  understood  the  procedures  and  the  payoff 
consequences of the available actions, each subject had to read a detailed set of instructions 
before the session started. Participants then had to answer several questions about the feasible 
actions and the payoff consequences of different actions. We started a session only after all 
subjects  had  correctly  answered  all  questions.  The  exchange  rate  between  experimental 
currency units (“points”) and real money was 15 Points = 1 Swiss Franc (~US $ 0.83, in 
summer 2007). 
In order to make the sellers familiar with the auction procedure we implemented two 
trial auctions – one with a rigid contract and one with a flexible contract – before we started 
the actual experiment. In the trial phase each seller had his own auction, i.e., they did not 
compete with another seller and no money could be earned. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We 
had 28 subjects (14 buyers and 14 sellers) in four of our five sessions and – due to no-shows – 
24 subjects (12 buyers and 12 sellers) in the remaining session. This yields a total number of 
136 participants in the experiment. A session lasted approximately two hours and subjects 
earned on average 49 Swiss Francs (CHF 49 ~ US $ 41, in summer 2007). 
III. Behavioral Predictions 
In this section we derive the predictions for our experiment and discuss some design features. 
III.A.  Predictions under Pure Self-Interest 
If  we  assume  common  knowledge  of  rationality  and  money-maximizing  behavior,  the 
predictions for this experiment are straightforward. Since shading on performance is costly, 
purely selfish sellers provide normal quality irrespective of the realized price in both types of 
contracts.  Buyers  anticipate  sellers’  behavior  and  choose  the  lowest  price  allowed  by  the – 10 – 
contract. In the contract auctions trade rivalry between sellers implies that the fixed price in 
rigid  contracts,  respectively  the  lower  price  bound  in  flexible  contracts,  ends  up  at  the 
competitive level, i.e. p
r = 35 and p
l = 35.
8 Accordingly, when buyers choose their contract 
types they anticipate the following outcomes: in the good state of nature both contract types 
deliver the same outcome (pB = v(q
n) – p = 140 – 35 = 105), but in the bad state of nature the 
flexible contract is more attractive, because it allows for trade (pB = v(q
n) – p = 140 – 95 = 
45), while the rigid contract leads to the realization of the outside-option (pB = xB = 10). This 
implies that buyers always choose the flexible contract. We summarize the prediction of the 
standard economic model as the 
Standard Hypothesis: 
a)  Market forces imply that the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price 
range in flexible contracts end up at the competitive level, i.e., p
r = p
l =35. 
b)  Sellers never choose low quality irrespective of the contract type and price level. Buyers 
always choose the lowest price available in flexible contracts. 
c)  Buyer’s profits are higher in flexible contracts than in rigid contracts. Therefore, buyers 
prefer flexible contracts. 
III.B.  Predictions if Contracts are Reference Points 
 According  to  Hart  and  Moore  (2008),  an  ex  ante  contract,  negotiated  under  competitive 
conditions,  shapes  parties’  entitlements  regarding  ex  post  outcomes.  In  Hart  and  Moore 
(2008), a party compares the ex post outcome to the best outcome permitted by the contract, 
and if he does not get what he feels entitled to he is aggrieved and shades on non-contractible 
aspects of performance. In the Appendix we extend Hart and Moore (2008) to allow for the 
case where parties may feel entitled to an outcome other than the best outcome. The model’s 
predictions are broadly similar to Hart and Moore (2008). Rigid contracts pin down outcomes, 
sellers get what they expect, and so sellers are not aggrieved. Accordingly, shading should not 
occur in rigid contracts. However, in a flexible contract, the seller may be aggrieved and 
shade if he gets a lower price than he had hoped for. We show that the heterogeneity in seller 
entitlements implies that the frequency of shading is decreasing in price. Given this the buyer 
will either increase the price in flexible contracts to avoid shading or accept the possibility of 
getting low quality. Thus, although the flexible contract guarantees trade in both states, the 
                                                 
8 Remember: Since p = 35 corresponds to p = c(q
l,g) + xS and the seller must offer at least p = c(q
l,b) + xS = 95 in 
the bad state of nature, a seller can never be worse off if he accepts a contract than if he accepts his outside 
option. – 11 – 
reference dependent behavior of sellers has a negative impact on the buyers’ profit. Hence 
flexible contracts may be less profitable than rigid contracts. Reference dependent behavior 
does not, however, change the auction outcome: rivalry between sellers still ensures that the 
lower bound of the price range in flexible contracts, and the fixed price in rigid contracts, is 
35. (Recall that we do not allow the price to fall below 35.) 
These considerations lead to the 
Reference Point Hypothesis: 
a)  Market forces imply that the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price 
range in flexible contracts end up at the competitive level, i.e., p
r = p
l =35. 
b)  In  rigid  contracts  sellers  never  choose  low  quality  irrespective  of  the  price  level.  In 
flexible  contracts  sellers’  quality  provision  is  price  dependent.  Heterogeneity  in  seller 
entitlements implies that the frequency of shading is decreasing in the price. Given the 
price dependence of quality, buyers may not choose the lowest price available in flexible 
contracts. 
c)  Buyer’s profits in flexible contracts are lower than predicted by the standard model. If the 
impact of the reference dependent preferences is strong, buyers may even make higher 
profits in rigid contracts than in flexible contracts. 
III. C. Discussion of Design Features 
It is important to emphasize that the aim of this paper in not to determine whether people 
succeed  in  choosing  the  optimal  contract  structure.  We  are  interested  rather  in  the  more 
fundamental question of whether the underlying behavioral assumptions of the Hart-Moore 
model turn out to be of empirical relevance. To study this question in a clean and controlled 
way, we have intentionally abstracted from many theoretically relevant features of the model. 
In this section we discuss to what extent the simplifications and specific decision structures in 
our experimental setup affect our predictions. 
While Hart and Moore (2008) assume that shading opportunities of buyers and seller 
are  symmetric,  we  simplify  matters  by  restricting  shading  to  sellers.  For  the  theoretical 
investigation  of  optimal  contracts  this  simplification  would  have  serious  consequences, 
because it implies that a flexible contract can always achieve the first best if the seller is given 
the right to choose price.
9 In other words, the trade-off between contractual flexibility and 
                                                 
9 In equilibrium buyers would choose the flexible contract, sellers would accept the competitive lower price 
bound at date 0, choose a price ex post equal to the buyers’ valuation (p = v(q
n)), and provide normal quality (q = – 12 – 
rigidity would be destroyed.
10 However, since optimality of contracts is not the focus of this 
study,  we  avoid  this  problem  by  restricting  the  set  of  feasible  contracts.  Specifically,  we 
exclude side payments and consider only structures in which the buyer decides about the 
contract type and chooses the ex-post price. Furthermore, since we aim at examining whether 
and how the contract type affects the sellers’ performance choice, we maximize the contrast 
between contractual rigidity and flexibility by implementing extreme forms of contracts. In 
the rigid contract the price is entirely fixed. The flexible contract, in contrast, determines only 
the lower bound of the price range and allows for any reasonable price above this limit (i.e., 




Studying  these  extreme  cases  gives  us  the  best  chance  to  illustrate  the  trade-off  between 
rigidity and flexibility in contracts. 
Another important simplification and limitation is that we have not allowed the parties 
to write informal state-contingent contracts. For example, the buyer and seller could agree 
that price will depend on the seller’s realized cost, which is observed by both parties. Hart and 
Moore (2008) discuss informal contracts of this kind. They argue that such contracts may be 
problematic in situations where there is a little bit of asymmetric information and the parties 
exhibit  self-serving  biases.  Under  these  conditions,  each  party  may  be  able  to  convince 
himself that the state is favorable to him. This is likely to lead to aggrievement and shading, 
as in the flexible contracts studied in this paper. Obviously, a considerably more complicated 
experiment would be required to test the role of informal state-contingent contracts in the 
presence of asymmetric information and self-serving biases. We leave this for future work. 
Hart and Moore (2008) assume that trading parties can choose the amount of shading 
in a continuous way and that there is no upper bound on shading. For the sake of simplicity 
we  implement  shading  as  a  binary  choice.  While  a  more  continuous  action  space  would 
change details of our predictions, it would not affect our main hypothesis that price dependent 
shading should occur only in flexible contracts. In addition, Hart and Moore (2008) assume 
that trading parties are indifferent between perfunctory and consummate performance, i.e., 
shading is neither costly nor beneficial. However, they emphasize that assuming indifference 
                                                                                                                                                          
q
n). Redistribution of surplus from sellers to buyers (because of competition) could be achieved through lump 
sum payments conditional on winning the contract auction. 
10 Hart and Moore (2008, p. 34/35) discuss how the predictions of the model can be rescued even if buyers 
cannot engage in shading. 
11 Hart and Moore (2008) predict that buyers would prefer the flexible contract to be less extreme. Given the 
decision structure and the restriction on price setting in our environment, the optimal flexible contract would set 
the upper bound at c(q
l, b) + xs. This would still allow for trade in the bad state of nature, but it would eliminate 
the room for aggrievement and shading in the bad state of nature. – 13 – 
is just a technically convenient way to capture the idea that the cost of providing low quality 
is not substantially higher or lower than the cost of providing normal quality. With regard to 
the  aim  of  our  paper,  implementing  strict  indifference  between  shading  and  normal 
performance in the experiment would have been problematic. The reason is that indifference 
would not rule out equilibrium shading under standard economic assumptions in our setup. In 
order to make sure that shading cannot be explained if people are motivated by pure self-
interest, we implemented costly shading. However, since the increase in the sellers’ costs is 
low (c(q
l, s) – v(q
n ,s) = 5) relative to the damage which shading imposes on the buyer (v(q
n) – 
v(q
l) = 40), our setup is still in line with the spirit of the model.
12  
It  is  obvious  that  the  probabilities  with  which  the  two  states  of  nature  occur  are 
decisive for the relative attractiveness of rigid and flexible contracts. Since we intend to study 
the impact of contract types on behavior, we need a sufficient number of observations for 
flexible and rigid contracts. The rigid contract is interesting only if the disadvantage due to 
the non-existence of trade in the bad state of nature is not too large. We therefore decided that 




In this section we present and discuss our results. The analysis of our data at the aggregate 
level  in  Section  IV.A  reveals  that  the  outcomes  of  our  experiment  largely  confirm  the 
reference point hypothesis and contradict the predictions of the standard economic theory. We 
observe that there are significant differences in average prices and quality levels between rigid 
and flexible contracts in the good state of nature. In Section IV.B we demonstrate how these 
findings can be explained in light of the different price dependence of sellers’ performance 
choices across the two contract types. Sections IV.C and IV.D illustrate that the predictions of 
the reference point theory are also relevant for individual behavior of sellers and buyer.  
                                                 
12 Alternatively we could also have chosen to make the provision of low quality slightly less costly than the 
provision of normal quality. However, the case of costly shading probably leads to stronger effects. It seems 
more likely that aggrievement triggers costly shading than that the absence of aggrievement causes people to 
engage in costly voluntary cooperation. The reason is that aggrievement certainly causes a negative sentiment, 
while  the  absence  of  aggrievement  may  be  completely  neutral  and  may  not  imply  the  positive  sentiment 
necessary to induce costly cooperation. Of course, this remains an empirical question that should be addressed in 
future work. 
13 Another way to make sure that we have a sufficient number of observations in both contract types would have 
been to assign contract types exogenously. However, this would have changed the spirit of the experiment in a 
fundamental way. From the perspective of the seller, it certainly makes a big difference whether the buyer 
himself chooses to limit his ability to adjust the price ex-post or whether this is imposed by the experimenter (see 
the discussion in Section V). – 14 – 
IV.A.  Aggregate Findings 
We find that our data are largely in line with all three parts of the reference point hypothesis 
stated at the end of Section III. Table II and Figure I summarize our main results. Table II 
presents averages of prices, quality choices, auction outcomes, profits and contract choices for 
rigid  and  flexible  contracts  in  the  good  and  bad  state  of  nature.  Figure  I  displays  the 
development of prices and quality choices over time. 
Insert Table II here 
IV.A.1.  Auction Outcomes in Rigid and Flexible Contracts 
We start with the competition part of the reference point hypothesis. Figure I illustrates the 
power  of  competition  in  the  auction  phase  of  our  experiment.  The  fixed  price  in  rigid 
contracts and the lower price bound in flexible contracts converge to the competitive price of 
35 over time. In the final period the auctions deliver an average fixed price of 35.7 and an 
average lower bound of 35.2. Because auction outcomes are somewhat higher in the early 
period of the experiment the overall averages of both the fixed price in rigid contracts and the 
lower bound of the price range in flexible contracts are slightly above the predicted level of 
35.  Both  averages  turn  out  to  be  about  40  (see  Table  II).  As  expected  a  non-parametric 
signed-rank test using session averages as observations confirms that the auction outcomes for 
rigid contracts and flexible contracts are not significantly different.
14 
Insert Figure I here 
IV.A.2.  Prices and Quality in Rigid and Flexible Contracts 
The fact that auction outcomes do not differ across contract types implies that, in principle, 
the buyers would have the possibility to pay the same prices in both types of contracts when 
the good state of nature is realized. However, if the reference point hypothesis is correct, 
buyers in flexible contracts may have incentives to increase their prices above the lower price 
bound, because low prices may aggrieve sellers and lead to shading. This is in fact what we 
observe. In 75 percent of the flexible contracts in which the good state has been realized, 
buyers pay a price which is strictly above the lower bound of the price range determined in 
the auction. Although the lower price bound is only about 40 on average, the average price 
level is 51 (see Table II). This difference between the actual price paid by the buyer and the 
lower bound of the price range is very stable and does not disappear over time (see Figure I). 
                                                 
14 The session averages for the fixed price in rigid contracts are: 37.3, 40.7, 40.5, 41.2 and 43.3. The session 
averages for the lower bound of the price range in flexible contracts are: 37.5, 41.6, 40.5, 38.7 and 43.4. – 15 – 
In rigid contracts, in contrast, the final price at date 1 is equal to the fixed price which has 
been determined in the auction at date 0. We have already shown above that these prices are 
around 40 on average and converge to the competitive level of 35 over time.
15 This implies 
that in the good state buyers pay on average substantially higher prices in flexible contracts 
than in rigid contracts. A non-parametric signed rank test confirms that the price difference 
between rigid and flexible contracts is statistically significant (p-value = 0.031 (one-sided)).
16 
Although prices are close to the competitive level, shading is almost absent in rigid 
contracts. Sellers provide normal quality in 94 percent of the cases in which the good state is 
realized. In flexible contracts, however, the higher prices are not always sufficient to prohibit 
sellers from shading. In the good state sellers provide normal quality in only 75 percent of the 
cases (see Table II). The difference in the frequency of shading between the two contract 
types is statistically significant (non-parametric signed rank test, p-value = 0.031 (one-sided)) 
and very stable over time (see Figure I).
17 
IV.A.3.  Payoffs and Contract Choice 
The differences in price and quality levels have important implications for payoffs of buyers 
and sellers in the good state of nature. Since prices are higher and quality is lower in flexible 
contracts, buyers earn, on average, considerably lower payoffs in flexible contracts (78.9) 
than in rigid contracts (96.8). The opposite is true for sellers. Although the higher frequency 
of shading increases sellers’ costs in flexible contracts, the price difference is large enough to 
offset this. While the average payoff of sellers in flexible contracts is 29.8, their payoff in 
rigid contracts is 20.4 (see Table II). Both payoff differences are highly significant according 
to non-parametric signed rank tests (Sellers: p-value = 0.031 (one-sided), Buyers: p-value = 
0.031 (one-sided)). 
In the bad state of nature rigid contracts do not allow for trade. Accordingly, buyers 
and sellers realize their outside-option. In flexible contracts trade takes place and buyers must 
offer them at least a price of 95. We observe that buyers pay on average a price of 98.4 (see 
Table II). Thus, while average prices are substantially higher than the lower price bound in 
the good state, prices in the bad state are very close to the minimal price buyers can offer. In 
                                                 
15 The “auction outcome” in Table II is the average of the fixed prices in all rigid contracts . The “price” in Table 
II and Figure I, in contrast, is the average of the fixed prices in all rigid contracts in which trade occurred. 
However, since the state of nature is randomly determined, this does not cause a systematic difference. 
16 The session averages for the price in rigid contracts are: 37.3, 40.8, 40.8, 41.0 and 43.4. The session averages 
for the price in flexible contracts are: 51.7, 49.7, 49.0, 50.2 and 54.0. 
17 In the good state the session level frequencies of high quality in rigid contracts are 89%, 97%, 95%, 91% and 
96%. The corresponding numbers for flexible contracts are 78%, 76%, 79%, 67% and 75%. – 16 – 
response shading is slightly more frequent in the bad state than in the good state. However, a 
non-parametric signed rank test shows that this difference is not statistically significant.
18 We 
will later investigate whether the price setting strategies of buyers in flexible contracts reflect 
profit-maximizing behavior. Since outside options generate only a payoff of 10, sellers and 
buyers are better off with a flexible contract in the bad state of nature. Average payoffs are 
29.7 for buyers and 16.9 for sellers, respectively. 
We  have  established  that  buyers  indeed  face  a  trade-off  between  rigidity  and 
flexibility. Given the stronger tendency for shading in flexible contracts, rigid contracts are 
more attractive in the good state of nature. However, since fixed prices prohibit trade when 
costs are high, having a flexible contract is of advantage in the bad state of nature. But which 
contract is more profitable in total? It turns out that overall the need to pay higher prices and 
the higher frequency of shading are strong enough to render flexible contracts less profitable 
for buyers than rigid contracts. While the average buyer payoff is 77.9 in rigid contracts, it is 
only  68.9  in  flexible  contracts.  This  difference  is  statistically  significant  (non-parametric 
signed  rank,  p-value  =  0.031  (one-sided)).
19  Sellers,  in  contrast,  are  better  off  in  flexible 
contracts. Average seller payoffs in rigid contracts are 18.1, compared to 27.9 in flexible 
contracts. Also this difference is statistically significant (non-parametric signed rank, p-value 
= 0.031 (one-sided)).
20 The finding that rigid contracts yield higher profits for buyers than 
flexible contracts is, of course, highly dependent on the choice of parameters. It is certainly 
easy  to  find  other  parameter  constellations  which  yield  the  opposite  results  (e.g.,  higher 
probability for bad state, weaker impact of shading on buyer’s value, etc.). However, our 
findings not only illustrates that a trade-off between contractual flexibility and rigidity exists, 
but also that there are parameters under which this trade-off has strong consequences for 
economic outcomes. 
In contrast to the standard prediction buyers have chosen rigid contracts in 50 percent 
of the cases (see Table II). If we look at the development over time, we observe that the share 
of rigid contracts has an upward tendency. It starts off at 38 percent in period 1 and ends up at 
                                                 
18 In the bad state of nature the session level frequencies of high quality in flexible contracts are 70%, 46%, 83%, 
58% and 83%. 
19 The session averages for buyer payoffs in rigid contracts are: 80.0, 80.1, 78.8, 75.0 and 75.3. The session 
averages for buyer payoffs in flexible contracts are: 71.0, 69.9, 71.4, 65.3 and 67.2. 
20 The session averages for buyer payoffs in rigid contracts are: 15.4, 18.4, 18.3, 18.1 and 20.1. The session 
averages for buyer payoffs in flexible contracts are: 28.1, 25.8, 25.7, 25.8 and 29.8. – 17 – 
55 percent in period 15. An OLS  regression of the fraction of rigid contracts on periods 
indicates that this positive time trend is statistically significant.
21 
IV.B.  Sellers’ Quality Choice: Contract-Dependent Price-Quality Relationships 
The discussion of Table II and Figure I has shown that in the aggregate our findings are 
supportive  for  the  reference  point  hypothesis.  Next,  we  analyze  whether  the  underlying 
behavioral patterns are also in line with the assumption that contracts provide reference points 
for trading relationships. We start with sellers’ performance choices. Figure II displays the 
relative  frequency  of  normal  quality  conditional  on  the  price  paid  by  the  buyer  for  each 
contract  type  and  both  states  of  nature.  In  addition,  the  figure  also  shows  the  relative 
frequency  with  which  each  price  level  is  chosen  by  buyers.  Notice  that  prices  on  the 
horizontal axis are rounded to the nearest multiple of ten. The figure provides strong support 
for the seller behavior predicted by the reference point hypothesis. In rigid contracts sellers 
almost always choose normal quality even if prices are very close to the competitive level. 
There is no noteworthy correlation between prices and the frequency of normal quality.
22 For 
flexible contracts, in contrast, the figure suggests a strong positive correlation between prices 
and the willingness to provide normal quality in both states of the world. If prices are close to 
the competitive level in the good state of nature, normal quality is chosen in less than 60 
percent of the contracts. The frequency of normal quality is clearly increasing in price, but in 
order to reach the same average quality as observed in rigid contracts, buyers must raise their 
price to a level of at least 75. In the bad state of nature prices close to the lowest possible level 
also trigger a lot of shading. At prices between 95 and 104 sellers provide normal quality in 
less than 70 percent of the contracts. Also in the bad state substantial price increases are 
necessary to reach a high quality level on average. 
Insert Figure II here 
We provide statistical backup for our observations on price dependence of quality with 
a regression analysis in Table III. In the first column of the table we investigate the good state 
of nature. We regress an indicator variable for choosing normal quality on price increments, 
an indicator variable for flexible contracts, and the interaction term of the two. We define 
price increments as the difference between the actual price and the competitive price of 35. 
                                                 
21 The regression uses one observation per period and session. The dependent variable is the fraction of rigid 
contracts, the explanatory variable is period. The estimated coefficients are as follows: Constant = 0.42, p-value 
< 0.001; Period = 0.010, p-value = 0.002 (p-values are based on robust standard errors). 
22 The low frequency of normal quality when prices are around 60 should be ignored, because it is based on very 
small number of outliers (see price distribution in Figure II). – 18 – 
Using price increments instead of prices allows us to interpret the constant as the frequency 
with which sellers provide high quality when buyers offers the competitive price of 35 in rigid 
contracts. The constant of 0.94 therefore reflects that prices close to the competitive level do 
not trigger much shading in rigid contracts. Furthermore, the coefficient of price increments is 
close to zero and insignificant indicating that sellers’ quality choices in rigid contracts do not 
depend on prices in a statistically significant way. The situation is very different in flexible 
contracts. The significantly negative coefficient of the dummy for flexible contracts shows 
that if prices are at the competitive level sellers are much more likely to choose low quality in 
flexible contracts than in rigid contracts (–0.34, p-value < 0.01). The regression also confirms 
the statistical significance of the positive impact of higher price increments on sellers’ quality 
choices in flexible contracts (F-Test: price increment + price incr. x flex. Contr. = 0, p-value < 
0.01).
23 In column (2) we show that a probit estimation (marginal effects reported) using the 
same set of variables yields results similar to the ones of the linear probability model used in 
column (1). Column (3) investigates the bad state of nature. We regress the indicator variable 
for choosing normal quality on price increments (now defined as the difference between price 
and the lowest possible price of 95). The constant indicates that the frequency of normal 
quality is only 0.66 when buyers pay the lowest possible price in the bad state of nature. In 
addition, the significant coefficient confirms that there is also a significant impact of price 
increments  on  quality  in  the  bad  state  of  nature.  Column  (4)  documents  that  a  probit 
estimation yields similar results (marginal effects reported). 
Insert Table III here 
IV.C.  Individual Seller Behavior: Quality Choice Within and Across Contracts 
The analysis of sellers’ behavior in Figure II and Table III is based on pooled data from all 
sellers  in  the  experiment.  However,  the  reference  point  hypothesis  relies  on  behavioral 
assumptions about preferences and makes specific predictions regarding individual behavior 
of  sellers  in  rigid  and  flexible  contracts.  Since  contract  assignment  is  endogenous  in  the 
experiment, our analysis hitherto does not provide evidence that our aggregate findings are 
the consequence of different behavior of the same sellers in different types of contracts. It 
could also be that the aggregate effects are the consequence of self-selection of distinct seller 
                                                 
23 Since the lower bound of the price range is not always equal to the competitive price, one might suspect that 
the realized lower bound could be relevant for the seller’s quality choice. For example, the seller could evaluate 
the generosity of the price paid by the buyer relative to the lower bound of the available price range. However, a 
regression of quality on price increments and the lower bound of the price range reveals that this does not seem 
to be the case. The coefficient for the lower bound of the price range is close to zero and not significant. – 19 – 
groups into different contract types. For example, the result that shading is more frequent in 
flexible contracts than in rigid contracts would also be observed if those sellers who self-
select into flexible contracts are systematically more likely to provide low quality than those 
sellers  who  self-select  into  rigid  contracts.  In  the  following  we  dig  deeper  and  examine 
whether sellers accept both types of contracts, and if so, how their behavior differs across 
contract types. 
In Figure III we show the distribution of rigid and flexible contracts over individual 
sellers in the experiment. We observe that most sellers do not self-select into a specific type 
of  contract,  i.e.,  most  sellers  conclude  several  rigid  as  well  as  several  flexible  contracts. 
Specifically, the figure reveals that every seller has experienced each contract type at least 
once and for most sellers there are multiple observations for each contract type (84 percent of 
sellers  have  experienced  at  least  four  contracts  of  each  type).  Furthermore,  even  if  we 
consider only contracts in which trade actually occurred, we still have at least one observation 
for each seller and contract type. This implies that each seller has made at least one quality 
decision in each type of contract, such that we can compare sellers’ performance choices 
across contract types. 
Insert Figure III here 
In Table IV we analyze individual behavior in detail. According to the reference point 
hypothesis  sellers  may  shade  on  performance  in  flexible  contracts,  but  never  in  rigid 
contracts. We find that 51 of the 68 sellers in our experiment exhibit a behavioral pattern 
which is consistent with this prediction. 27 of these 51 sellers do not provide low quality in 
either contract type (first column), while the other 24 sellers provide low quality in some of 
their flexible contracts (second column). Notice: while the behavior of sellers who do not 
shade  on  performance  at  all  can  also  be  explained  by  standard  economic  theory  (see  the 
standard prediction in section III.A), this behavior does not contradict the reference point 
hypothesis.  If  a  seller  happens  to  receive  offers  above  his  threshold  price  whenever  he 
concludes a flexible contract, it is plausible that he never shades on performance. Since sellers 
do not indicate their threshold price in our experiment, we cannot compare the threshold 
prices of sellers across differently behaving groups. However, Table IV shows that sellers 
who  never  provide  low  quality  have  concluded  a  lower  number  of  flexible  contracts  and 
receive, on average, higher price offers in these contracts (especially in the good state of 
nature). These two factors make it less likely that a seller with a given intensity of reference 
dependence engages in shading. – 20 – 
The remaining 17 sellers in our experiment exhibit behavior which is not consistent 
with the reference point hypothesis, i.e., they provide at least once low quality in a rigid 
contract (see third and fourth column in Table IV). A closer look reveals that 7 of these sellers 
show behavioral patterns which are “almost in line” with the prediction of the reference point 
hypothesis: They provide exactly once low quality in a rigid contract and they shade more 
often in flexible contracts than in rigid contracts, both in absolute and relative terms. Only 10 
of  our  68  sellers  make  decisions  which  are  clearly  not  in  line  with  the  reference  point 
hypothesis. 
In addition, the reference point hypothesis also suggest a positive (or zero) correlation 
of prices and quality in flexible contracts for each individual seller. However, the limited 
number  of  observations  per  individual  combined  with  the  fact  that  average  prices  (and 
therewith  possibly  also  threshold  prices)  change  over  time  make  this  a  rather  tough  test. 
Nevertheless,  for  the  good  state  of  nature  we  observe  positive  correlations  of  prices  and 
quality for 18 of the 24 subjects who exclusively shade in flexible contracts (column 2 of 
Table IV). In 7 of these 18 cases the correlation is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The remaining 6 sellers have either never provided low quality in the good state (2 cases) or 
the correlation is insignificantly negative. If we do the same analysis for the 7 sellers whose 
quality choices are “almost in line” with the reference point hypothesis (column 3 of Table 
IV) we find a positive correlation of prices and quality for each individual. In 5 cases the 
correlation is significant at the 10% level.
24 
Insert Table IV here 
IV.D.  Individual Buyer Behavior: Price Setting and Contract Choice 
Our analysis has shown that seller behavior is by and large in line with the reference point 
hypothesis. It is interesting to examine how buyers react to the behavioral patterns of sellers 
when they choose a contract type and set prices in flexible contracts. From Table II we know 
that overall buyers choose the rigid contract in 50 percent of the cases. Although we have 
shown that there is a positive time trend (see the regression results in Footnote 21), it may 
appear rather astonishing that the significantly higher average payoffs have not motivated 
more buyers to choose the rigid contract. However, since the higher average payoff in rigid 
contracts comes with a higher variance (see the payoffs per state in Table II) buyers’ risk 
aversion  (or  loss  aversion)  may  play  an  important  role  for  this  finding.  The  buyers  may 
                                                 
24 Given the even smaller number of observations, a similar analysis is not feasible for the bad state of nature. – 21 – 
perceive the possibility to end-up with the no-trade outcome of rigid contracts as too risky. 
Our post-experimental questionnaires confirm this presumption. About 50 percent of buyers 
indicate that they didn’t want to take the chance of getting only the outside option of 10 in 
case of the realization of the bad state and therefore went for flexible contracts. 
A second important issue regarding the buyers’ behavior is their response to the price 
dependence  of  quality  in  flexible  contracts.  Are  buyers  able  to  figure  out  the  profit-
maximizing price or do they lose money in flexible contracts, because they fail to adopt the 
price properly? Figure IV displays average buyer profits conditional on the realized price for 
both contract types and both states of nature. Notice that prices are rounded to the nearest 
multiple of ten. In addition, the figure also displays the relative frequency with which each 
price has been realized. In flexible contracts in which the good state has been realized, it 
makes apparently most sense to set a price between 35 and 54. These prices yield average 
payoffs between 83 and 84 to buyers. These most profitable prices are chosen in 68 percent of 
the contracts. Buyers who set prices between 55 and 64 still get an average payoff of 77. This 
happened in 16 percent of the contracts. Increasing prices above 65 has strongly negative 
consequences  for  average  payoffs.  However,  buyers  picked  such  high  prices  in  only  16 
percent  of  the  contracts,  implying  that  buyers  are  rather  successful  in  finding  the  most 
profitable price range. The same is true for flexible contracts in which the bad state of nature 
has been realized. In this case Figure IV shows that the most profitable prices are between 95 
and 104. These prices result in average payoffs of about 30. Buyers choose prices in this 
range in 90 percent of the cases. In another 7 percent of contracts buyers pick prices in the 
range from 105 to 115. These prices yield only slightly lower average payoffs of 28. Higher 
prices, which yield much lower payoffs, are chosen only in 3 percent of the contracts. In rigid 
contracts  buyers  cannot  influence  the  price.  Since  quality  is  not  price  dependent  in  rigid 
contracts, average profits of buyers are highest when prices are low. 
Insert Figure IV here 
While we find that the majority of buyers choose prices close to the profit-maximizing 
level, there is still some room for improvement. However, even if buyers had chosen optimal 
prices in every flexible contract average payoffs would still be below average payoffs of rigid 
contracts: 0.8 x 84 + 0.2 x 30 = 73.2 < 77.9 (see Table II). This illustrates that in our setup the 
impact of sellers’ reference dependence is strong enough to change the optimal structure of 
the contract relative to the standard economic model. – 22 – 
V.  Discussion 
Part of our interpretation of the data relies on the observation that many people seem to be 
willing to punish their trading partners for inappropriate behavior (in our case the payment of 
low prices in flexible contracts), even if this is costly for them and yields no material gain. 
Since such behavior has been extensively studied in theoretical and empirical work on social 
preferences, it is important to understand how our study relates to this literature. 
Theories of social preferences assume that people are not solely motivated by their 
material self-interest but also take social considerations, especially fairness concerns, into 
account. There are two main classes of fairness theories: theories based on inequity aversion 
and reciprocity models. Models of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000) suppose that people dislike inequitable outcomes and are therefore willing to 
forgo  material  payoff  in  order  to  prevent  these  outcomes  from  occurring.  Despite  their 
simplicity models of inequity aversion can explain many experimental results which seem 
puzzling from the perspective of the standard self-interest model (see e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 
2002).  Most  important  for  our  purpose  is  the  evidence  from  the  ultimatum  game.  In  the 
ultimatum game the first mover (proposer) has to decide how to divide a certain amount of 
money between himself and the second mover (responder). The responder can either accept or 
reject  the  suggested  division  of  pie.  In  case  of  acceptance  each  party  receives  the  share 
suggested by the proposer, in case of rejection both parties get zero. The typical result in this 
experiment is that proposers offer a considerable share of the pie because they rightly fear that 
responders reject low amounts (see, e.g., Güth et al. 1982, Camerer and Thaler 1995). These 
findings are relevant for our study because they are similar to what we observe in flexible 
contracts, where buyers have to offer a high price in order to deter sellers from shading on 
performance. Since paying low prices generates unequal payoffs of buyers and sellers in our 
setup, inequity aversion implies that sellers should shade on performance when buyers pay 
low prices, because the provision of low quality  reduces the payoff inequality. However, 
while inequity aversion is in line with the rejection of low offers in ultimatum games and the 
price  dependent  shading  in  flexible  contracts,  it  cannot  explain  why  sellers  almost  never 
provide low quality in rigid contracts. The reason is that in models of inequity aversion the 
allocation  of  final  payoffs  alone  determines  the  perceived  unfairness  of  an  outcome. 
Accordingly, these models predict the same price dependency of quality in both types of – 23 – 
contracts. As prices are close to the competitive level in rigid contracts, these models predict a 
high frequency of shading.
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The more sophisticated reciprocity models take into account that the same outcome 
may  trigger  different  fairness  perceptions  depending  on  how  the  outcome  came  about. 
Specifically, these models assume that the evaluation of an outcome depends not only on the 
realized allocation of payoffs but also on people’s belief about the intentions of their trading 
partner (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Charness and Rabin 2004, Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006). The intuition is that people perceive an unfavorable outcome as more 
unfair if another player intentionally chooses the outcome than if the payoff distribution is 
beyond the other player’s control. The main difference between the two contract types in our 
experiment is that rigid contracts restrict the buyer’s choice set to one predetermined outcome 
which is usually not very favorable to the seller, while flexible contracts enable the buyer to 
choose between many possible outcomes, including ones which are very  attractive to the 
seller. If we translate this into the framework of the ultimatum game, the relevant comparison 
would be between one setup where the proposer is forced to offer a small fraction of the pie 
and a setup where the proposer can choose between offering small and large fractions of the 
pie. Falk et al. (2003) implement two treatments in an ultimatum game experiment which 
make such a comparison possible. In one of their treatments the proposer, who is endowed 
with 10 points, can choose between the equal split (5 points to each player) and an unequal 
allocation in which the proposer gets 8 points while the responder is left with 2 points. In 
another treatment the proposer has no choice but to offer the unequal allocation (8 for himself 
and 2 for the responder). The evidence shows that the rejection rate for the unequal allocation 
strongly depends on whether the equal split is available or not. When the proposer could have 
chosen the equal split, the unequal offer is rejected in roughly 44 percent of the cases. When 
the  unequal  allocation  was  the  only  alternative  available  to  the  proposer,  the  rejection 
frequency was only 18 percent.
26 While these findings are not in line with inequity aversion, 
they can be explained by reciprocity. If the proposer chooses the unequal allocation when the 
equal split would have been available, it is clear that the proposer intentionally created an 
                                                 
25 Using the models of inequity aversion to derive full-fledged predictions for our experiment is not trivial. One 
problem  is  that  the  models  do  not  specify  precisely  how  the  reference  group  relative  to  which  individuals 
evaluate their payoffs is determined (e.g., sellers could compare their payoff to the (expected) payoff of both 
buyers and the other seller in their group or only to the buyer and the other seller involved in the trade or even 
only to their direct trading partner). However, while different assumptions with respect to the reference group 
may influence the predicted behavior in auctions and contracts, they do not affect the prediction that the price-
quality relation should be independent of the contract type. 
26 Charness and Rabin (2002) report evidence from similar games (see Berk23and Berk27, page 844). Their 
results show the same pattern, although both rejection rates are much smaller (9 percent if the equal split was 
available and 0% otherwise). – 24 – 
“unfair” outcome. As this is perceived as an unkind action, it is likely to trigger an unkind 
response by a reciprocally motivated responder. If the unequal allocation is realized when the 
proposer did not have a choice, responders may still not like it, but they do not blame the 
proposer and are therefore less likely to retaliate. 
However,  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  the  experiment  of  Falk  et  al. 
(2003)  and  our  experiment.  In  the  ultimatum  games  of  Falk  et  al.  (2003)  the  proposer’s 
strategy space is chosen by the experimenter, i.e., the proposers is assigned to either a game 
with only one option or a game with two options. In our experiment, in contrast, the contract 
types are endogenously determined within the experiment, i.e., the buyers themselves choose 
whether they want to interact within a rigid or a flexible contract. This difference is important, 
because it is likely to change how outcomes are attributed to intentions. If the proposers in 
Falk et al. (2003) had had the choice between the two games, reciprocity theories would no 
longer predict a difference in rejection rates for the unequal allocation across games. The 
reason is that choosing the game with the restricted choice set would be perceived as an 
intentionally  unfair  action  which  calls  for  punishment.  Similarly,  in  the  context  of  our 
experiment intention based reciprocity models would predict that sellers punish buyers who 
choose the rigid contract. Under the assumption that the buyer anticipates the competitive 
outcomes  of  the  contract  auctions,  choosing  the  rigid  contract  means  that  the  buyer 
intentionally chooses a low payoff for the seller in both states of the world. In the good state 
trade will take place at the competitive price and in the bad state the seller is forced to take his 
unattractive outside option. Thus, a generous buyer would rather choose the flexible contract 
and pay a high price in both states of the world. 
A crucial difference between the fairness models discussed above and Hart and Moore 
(2008) is that the latter explicitly assume that people perceive outcomes of a competitive 
bargaining  process  as  acceptable  or  fair.  The  idea  is  that  competition  adds  an  objective 
dimension to the bargaining process which provides the outcome with a certain justification. 
This assumption is important in our experiment. In contrast to the experiments in Falk et al. 
(2003) where the payoff structure of the ultimatum game is exogenously given, the contract 
terms  in  our  experiment  are  endogenously  determined  in  competitive  auctions.  The  low 
frequency of shading in rigid contracts suggests that sellers do indeed not blame the buyer for 
the unequal outcome in a rigid contract, but rather view it as the natural and justified outcome 
of a competitive market. This implies that buyers can circumvent the punishment for unequal – 25 – 
outcomes  by  delegating  the  determination  of  the  outcome  to  the  forces  of  a  competitive 
market.
27 
The result that sellers earn higher average payoffs in flexible contracts than in rigid 
contracts  is  to  a  certain  extent  an  artifact  of  our  simplified  design.  In  the  more  general 
theoretical setting of Hart and Moore (2008) the availability of ex-ante side payments would 
imply that the differences in seller payoffs across contracts should disappear. However, the 
fact that sellers shade significantly less in rigid contracts although they get substantially lower 
profits than in flexible contracts makes our results only stronger. The reason is that people’s 
fairness consideration work against the reference point hypothesis. Reciprocity suggests that 
sellers may want to punish buyers for choosing the contract which gives them lower payoffs. 
Since the introduction of side payments would equalize sellers’ payoffs across contracts, such 
fairness concerns would become less relevant and there would probably be even less shading 
in rigid contracts. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we provide empirical support for the behavioral assumptions underlying the 
theory of Hart and Moore (2008). Our experimental evidence is in line with the idea that 
competitively determined contract terms constitute a reference point for a trading relationship. 
When buyers implement flexible contracts, which allow for many different outcomes, sellers 
seem to be disappointed if the buyer chooses an outcome which is not attractive to them. In 
response to an unfavorable outcome sellers are willing to engage in costly shading activities 
which reduce buyers’ payoffs. However, when the buyers implement a contract with very 
rigid terms such that outcomes are pinned down from the outset and sellers know exactly 
what to expect, the same unfavorable outcomes do not trigger shading. Given uncertainty 
about the state of nature, these behavioral regularities imply a trade-off between contractual 
rigidity and flexibility. While flexible contracts are desirable because they allow the buyer to 
adjust the contract to the state of nature, rigid contracts have the advantage that they avoid 
inefficient shading activities. 
                                                 
27 Recent experimental work shows that people can also avoid punishment for unequal outcomes by shifting the 
relevant decision to another person (see Bartling and Fischbacher 2008 and Coffman 2008). In Coffman (2008) 
player A has two options. He can either play a dictator game with player C or he can sell the dictator game to 
player B, who then plays the game with player C. If player A decides to sell the game, the price is determined in 
a competitive double auction. In both cases player C observes the outcome and has the possibility to attribute 
punishment points to player A. It turns out that player A is less punished for the same final outcome if he sells 
the game to player B than if he plays the dictator game himself. In future work it would be interesting to look 
more closely at how these findings are related to our work.  – 26 – 
There  are  several  ways  in  which  our  work  could  be  extended.  First,  it  would  be 
interesting to know how important the assumption of ex ante perfect competition is. Suppose 
that there is a single seller from the start and the buyer picks the price at date 0 in the fixed 
price  contract.  At  date  1,  the  seller  may  well  regard  the  price  as  unfair  since  it  was  not 
negotiated competitively, i.e., the contract no longer serves as a reference point. One might 
therefore now expect shading in the fixed price contract. Preliminary results of an experiment 
that we have carried out suggest that this is indeed the case (see Fehr et al. (2008)). Second, 
we have tested a simplified version of Hart-Moore (2008) in which, although contract choice 
is endogenous, the structure of contracts and the degree of flexibility are predetermined. In 
future experiments it would be desirable to investigate truly endogenous contract structures, 
including the possibility of lump sum transfers. 
Finally, we have ignored renegotiation. Suppose that a fixed price contract is written at 
date 0 and the bad state occurs. Assume that the parties have the chance to renegotiate to 
enjoy the gains from trade. Will they do so? Will such a mutually beneficial renegotiation 
create bad feeling, given that the price was already fixed, and hence lead to shading? Does the 
possibility of renegotiation open the door to hold-up; that is, will the seller try to force a 
renegotiation in order to grab more of the surplus, even if trade would occur in the absence of 
renegotiation? Experiments can clarify the answers to these important questions, and thereby 
provide new understanding of the foundations of long-term trading agreements. 
 
Appendix 
In this Appendix we formally derive the reference point hypothesis described in section III.B. 
In order to formalize the role of aggrievement we define the reference price p
R(t, s) as the 
price the seller feels entitled to, given the contract type t and the realized state of nature s. 
While Hart and Moore (2008) assume that the seller always feels entitled to the best outcome 
admitted by the contract, we make a more general and less extreme assumption. We suppose 
that the seller’s reference price p
R can be any price permitted by the terms of the contract. In 
addition, we also allow for the possibility that the reference price depends on the realized 
state. In a flexible contract the reference price therefore satisfies p
R(f, s) Î [p
l, p
u]. In a rigid 
contract, in contrast, the reference price of the seller must be equal to the fixed price: p
R(r, s) 
= p
r. Loosely following the formulation in Hart and Moore (2008) we assume that the seller’s 
utility can be written as follows: 
uS = pS – q max[(p
R(t, s) – p), 0] I(q), – 27 – 
where q ³ 0 and I(q) is an indicator function, which is unity if q = q
n and zero otherwise. The 
second term captures the psychic costs of aggrievement, which become relevant if the realized 
price p is smaller than the seller’s reference price p
R. The parameter q measures the intensity 
of the seller’s aggrievement if he feels shortchanged. The indicator function I(q) implies that a 
seller can completely offset his aggrievement if he shades on performance and thereby hurts 
the buyer by lowering his valuation for the delivered product.
28 
Rigid contracts never lead to aggrievement. The buyer has no other possibility than to 
pay the fixed price which has been determined in the competitive auction. Since the fixed 
price is also the seller’s reference price, the seller gets exactly what he feels entitled to. Thus, 
whenever the good state is realized, there is trade and the seller delivers the normal quality. If 
the bad state is realized, trade does not take place and the buyer realizes his outside option. 






r] + (1 – w
g)x
B. 
In flexible contracts, in contrast, realized prices can be different from reference prices and 
aggrievement  may  play  a  role.  This  implies  that  the  seller’s  performance  is  no  longer 
independent of the price. Specifically, if the buyer offers a low price, the seller may be willing 
to bear the cost of shading in order to avoid the psychic cost of aggrievement. Formally, we 
                                                 
28 The assumption that shading completely offsets aggrievement may seem strong. In the original model of Hart 
and Moore (2008) the reference dependent disutility of traders consists of the difference between the money 
equivalent of aggrievement and the monetary loss which shading imposes on the other party. Since shading is 
continuous and unbounded, traders can always avoid this disutility. As long as the reference dependent part of 
sellers’ utility function is not too important, our formulation is in line with the original model. Specifically, it 
needs to be true that q(p
R(t, s) – p) £ v(q
n) – v(q
l) = 40. This is not extremely restrictive. For example, even if the 
reference dependent part of utility and the monetary part are equally important (i.e., q =1), the seller can still 
have a reference price of 75 in the good state and 135 in the bad state. An alternative way to formalize the impact 




l) > 0, this implies that shading only partly offsets aggrievement. While this formulation leads 




l, s) – c(q
n, s) / q(q
n) – q(q
l)]), it changes the prediction for the acceptance choices of sellers in 
auctions of flexible contracts. As long as shading completely offsets aggrievement, sellers are always willing to 
accept the contract at any available price in the auction (see also Footnote 8). This is no longer true if shading 
only partly offsets aggrievement. Since sellers cannot completely avoid suffering from aggrievement, it may now 
be the case that some sellers prefer to realize the outside option if they anticipate that the buyer will set a low 
price  in  a  flexible  contract.  This  implies  that  the  lower  price  bound  of  flexible  contracts  would  no  longer 
converge to the competitive level, but would depend on the intensity of the reference dependent preferences of 
the two sellers involved in the auction. As a consequence the auction outcome would provide the buyer with 
information about the preferences of the winning seller. This information would influence the optimal price in 
both states of nature. Since sellers anticipate that buyers use information conveyed by the auction outcome to 
adjust their price, some types of sellers may have strategic incentives to hide their true preferences and signaling 
may become an issue. In section IV we illustrate that both the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower price 
bound in flexible contracts converge to the competitive level and there is no statistically significant difference 
between the auction outcomes in the two contract types. Therefore we do not further pursue the implications of 
this alternative model. – 28 – 
can define a threshold price p
T which the buyer needs to pay in order to motivate the seller to 
provide normal quality in a flexible contract: 
p
T(s) = p
R(f, s) – [c(q
l, s) – c(q
n, s) / q]. 
Sellers may be heterogeneous with regard to both the reference prices p
R and the intensity of 
aggrievement q. This implies that different sellers may have different threshold prices p
T. Let 
Fs(·)  be  the  distribution  function  of  threshold  prices  in  the  state  s.  After  observing  the 
realization of the state at date 1 a buyer who has concluded a flexible contract chooses his 
price as follows: 
p
f
s = arg max v(q
n)Fs(p) + v(q
l)[1 – Fs(p)] – p. 
This shows that in flexible contracts the optimal price in each state of nature depends on the 
characteristics of the distribution function of threshold prices in this state. For example, if 
many sellers have rather low reference prices and moderate price increases substantially lower 
the frequency of shading, buyers have strong incentives to increase the price above the lower 
price  bound.  On  the  other  hand,  if  most  reference  prices  are  high  and  only  large  price 
increases help to prevent shading, the buyers may prefer to pay a low price and accept the 
consequences of a high frequency of shading. In any case, however, the fact that the sellers’ 
quality choices depend on the price offered by the buyer has a negative impact on buyers’ 
profits in flexible contracts relative to the standard prediction. The buyer’s expected payoff if 





















This  establishes  the  trade-off  between  contractual  flexibility  and  rigidity  described  in  the 
reference point hypothesis in section  III.B: i)  Our assumption that sellers can completely 
offset  aggrievement  by  shading  implies  that  they  are  willing  to  accept  a  contract  at  any 
available price (see Footnote 28 for details). Accordingly, the competitive auctions will drive 
the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price range in flexible contracts 
down to the competitive level (p
r = p
l =35). ii) Rigid contracts have the advantage that buyers 
can pay low prices and do not suffer from shading in the good state. The downside of rigid 
contracts is that there is no trade in the bad state. iii) Flexible contracts guarantee trade in both 
states  of  nature.  However,  buyers  have  to  increase  the  price  above  the  competitive  level 
and/or  bear  the  consequences  of  shading  in  both  states  of  nature.  This  reduces  buyers’ 
payoffs. – 29 – 
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Table I: Experimental Parameters 
State of nature
Seller's quality normal (q = q
n) low (q = q
l) normal (q = q
n) low (q = q
l)
Seller's costs 20 25 80 85
Buyer's valuation 140 100 140 100
Good [Prob(s = g) = 0.8] Bad [Prob(s = b) = 0.2]
 
Notes: The table summarizes the main parameters of the experiment. Buyers’ valuation for the product and 
sellers’ production costs are displayed for both states of nature and both quality levels available to the 
seller. 
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Table II: Summary of Outcomes in Rigid and Flexible Contracts 
Contract Type
State of Nature Good Bad Good Bad
Average Price 40.7 - 51.1 98.4
Rel. Freq. of Normal Quality 0.94 - 0.75 0.70
Average Auction Outcome
Average Profit Buyer (per state) 96.8 10 78.9 29.7
Average Profit Seller (per state) 20.4 10 29.8 16.9
Average Profit Buyer (over both states)
Average Profit Seller (over both states)
Rel. Freq. of Contract
18.1 27.2
0.50 0.50





Notes:  The  table  summarizes  the  outcomes  for  rigid  and  flexible  contracts  in  both  states  of  nature.  All 
numbers are based on the data of all 5 sessions. Average Price is the average of the trading price and Relative 
Frequency of Normal Quality measures how often the seller has chosen the normal quality. For rigid contracts 
this information is only available for the good state, because trade does not occur in the bad state. Average 
Auction Outcome is the average of the fixed price in case of rigid contracts and the lower bound of the price 
range in case of flexible contracts. Average Profit Buyer (Seller) (per state) measures the average payoff of 
buyers (sellers) for each state and contract. In rigid contracts the payoffs in the bad state of nature are the 
outside options of the market participants. Average Profit Buyer (over both states) is the overall average 
payoff of buyers (sellers) for each contract type. Relative Frequency of Contract is the share of the total 
number of contracts that corresponds to each contract type. 
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Table III: Price Dependence of Quality Across Contract Types 
Dependent Variable
OLS Probit [ME] OLS Probit [ME]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price increment 0.000 0.000 0.013* 0.023***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.009]
Flexible contract -0.335*** -0.298***
[0.060] [0.060]




Observation 805 805 104
R
2 0.13 0.03
Quality [s=g] Quality [s=b]
 
Notes: Price increment is defined as price minus 35 in columns (1) and (2) and as price minus 95 in 
columns (3) and (4). Flexible contract is an indicator variable which is unity if the contract is of the 
flexible type and zero otherwise. Price inc. x Flex is the interaction term of price increment and flexible 
contract.  Columns  (1)  and  (3)  report  coefficients  of  OLS  estimations.  Columns  (2)  and  (4)  report 
marginal effects based on probit estimations. Since observations within sessions may be dependent all 
reported standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the session level. *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level,  **  indicates  significance at the 5 percent level and  * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level. – 34 – 
Table IV: Sellers’ Quality Choices at the Individual Level 
Total
Shading No Flex. only Mostly flex. Flex.&Rigid
Number of sellers 27 24 7 10 68
Population fraction 0.40 0.35 0.10 0.15 1
Rigid contracts
Average price [s=g] 40.6 41.3 41.6 39.8 40.8
Rel. freq. of q
n [s=g] 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.67 0.93
Av. number of contracts 8.2 6.5 8.1 7.3 7.5
Flexible contracts
Average price [s=g] 54.2 49.4 50 53.4 51.9
Rel. freq. of q
n [s=g] 1.00 0.67 0.47 0.70 0.78
Average price [s=b] 98.7 97.7 98.5 99.6 98.4
Rel. freq. of q
n [s=b] 1.00 0.61 0.58 0.56 0.77
Av. number of contracts 6.3 8.5 9.3 7.1 7.5
Consistent with RPH Inconsistent with RPH
 
Notes: The shading categories are defined as follows: “No” stands for sellers who always provide normal 
quality irrespective of the contract type. “Flex. only” are sellers who never provide low quality in rigid 
contracts, but provide low quality in flexible contracts at least once. “Mostly flex.” are sellers who provide 
low quality exactly once in rigid contracts and at least once in flexible contracts. “Flex. & Rigid” are all 
sellers who do not fit into one of the other categories. Numbers in the last column (“Total”) slightly differ 
from  the  numbers  in  Table  II,  because  numbers  reported  in  this  table  are  averages  over  individual 
averages, while Table II directly averages over all contracts. 
 – 35 – 
Figure I: Development of Quality and Prices over Time 
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Figure II: Price Distribution and Frequency of Normal Quality Conditional on Price 
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Figure III: Accepted Number of Rigid and Flexible Contracts per Individual Seller 
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Figure IV: Price Distribution and Average Profit of Buyers Conditional on Price 
 
 